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This thesis investigates whether a corporate alliance
between international air carriers is beneficial,
considering the changes in the global air transport system.
Dividing the research method into three phases, the author
first lists and identifies the recent changes in world air
transport trends.

Then, the author defines the different

types of alliances and studies the advantages and
disadvantages of these corporate alliances.

Finally, a

multiple regression analysis is performed using the
KLM/Northwest Airlines alliance as a case analysis.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Problem Statement
The central issue of this thesis is to study whether
corporate alliances between international air carriers are
beneficial, considering the changes in the world air
transport system.

A qualitative and a quantitative study of

corporate alliances is conducted in this thesis.
Specifically, the author's goal is to define the different
types of corporate alliances and investigate the advantages
and disadvantages of them.

The KLM/Northwest Airlines

alliance is used as the basis for a quantitative study.

B. Hypothesis
This thesis utilizes the inductive approach where a
conclusion is drawn after an analysis of the facts.

For

example, after gathering information from selected sources
and references, and analyzing the data, the author concluded
that corporate alliances between international air carriers
is beneficial.

Therefore, an a priori

needed.
1

hypothesis is not

2
C. Introduction
Since U.S. domestic airline deregulation (Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978), the previously conservative
international air traffic system and structure has
confronted and instituted changes.

Moreover, U.S.

deregulation has significantly altered the domestic market
of the United States.

Through the adaptation phase of

deregulation, those airlines that successfully survived the
environment of open competition have become more efficient
and competitive.
While utilizing the aforementioned trend as a resource,
the national interest of the U.S. is to increase its share
of the international air transportation market.
Furthermore, liberalization spread through some of the world
air transport industry in the 1980s, bringing about
revolutionary changes which wore away some of the
traditional regulatory system aspects in certain
countries.l
Owing to the U.S. megacarriers', such as the American,
United, and Delta Airlines, aggressive penetration into some
foreign markets, the European nations, in concert with their
planned 1992 economic integration, began to plan a
consolidation process for an intra-European air transport
market.

The objective is to survive the strong challenge

'Daniel, Kasper. Deregulation and Globalization.
Ballinger Publication. 1988.

New York:
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from the U.S., protect their national carriers from
international competitors, and elevate their bargaining
power in bilateral agreements with other nations.2
Besides the national and regional changes, several
technical modifications and innovations have occurred in the
air transport industry.

Privatization of companies

previously owned and controlled by national governments has
taken place for the purpose of promoting and stimulating
efficiency and increasing productivity.3

Hub and spoke

systems were inaugurated in the U.S. which increased the
productivity of resources and efficiency in scheduling
aircraft.

This has led to congestion and saturation at some

hub airports during popular departure times.

Hence, access

to these airports has become restricted due to limited gates
and landing slots.4

Airlines that were able to obtain

gates and slots prior to congestion and saturation of these
busy airports dominated these hubs with increased
frequencies and abundant destinations, while potential
competitors were unable to compete due to a lack of gates
and slots.

2

Mark W. Lyon, "Pacific Rim Carriers Meet the Threat of
Protectionism", Airline Executive, December 1989, 27.
3

Kevin B. Boberg and Frederick M. Collison, International
Trends in the Pacific Basin, Transportation Journal, Vol.28, No.3
(Spring 1989), 28.
4

Paul Proctor, "System Capacity May Limit Pacific Rim
Traffic Growth", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 February
1990, p. 41.

4
Also, the invention and improvement of the Computer
Reservation System (CRS) took place enabling airlines with
their own systems to become more productive and efficient
compared to competitors.

The CRSs are being used as a

distribution tool for expansion into foreign markets.
Besides, the concept of CRS is branching out beyond air
travel and into general electronic information sales.

These

CRS create new revenue streams which contribute to the
profits of each carrier.5
In developing strategies to compete effectively against
some of the U.S. megacarriers, European and Asian airlines
have been rapidly increasing their global reach through
marketing alliances, code sharing, and joint-service routes
with other U.S. carriers.

This strategy enables them to

gain access to new markets while minimizing financial risk.
This trend is forecast to expand significantly in the
future, since this corporate strategy allows the foreign
carriers to circumvent the current restrictive bilateral air
service agreements in place with the U.S.b

Therefore, it

is fair to say that the issue of corporate alliances will
remain one of the most complex and controversial topics in
the global air transport industry.
5

Paul S. Dempsey, "Turbulence in the Open Skies: The
Deregulation of International Air Transport", The Transportation
Law Journal, (1987), 46.
b

Paul Proctor, Marketing Alliances, "Joint Services Help
Asian Airlines Extend Reach", Aviation Week & Space Technology,
26 November 1990, pp. 74,75.

CHAPTER II

CORPORATE AIRLINE ALLIANCE

A. What is a Corporate Airline Alliance
An airline alliance is a partnership between two or
more air carriers.

The three forms of alliances are: simple

alliance, strong alliance, and corporate merger.

The three

alliances are differentiated depending upon the amount of
capital investment and the variation in the form of the
functional agreements between airlines.

A simple alliance

consists of a generic marketing alliance, code-sharing, and
joint-service routes between two or more airlines without
any substantial amount of capital investment from each.

A

strong alliance includes all the functions served by a
simple alliance with the addition of obtaining a stake in
the other airline's equity.

Lastly, a corporate merger

involves one airline taking over the ownership control of
another airline.
The three types of alliances present different
advantages and disadvantages for airlines seeking to use an
alliance as a corporate strategy to compete domestically
and/or globally. Therefore, each airline must conduct a
5
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careful analysis to determine its needs and circumstances
before implementing a particular alliance.
Since a simple alliance does not require any capital
investment on the part of the two airlines, it enables an
airline to minimize its financial risk if confronted with an
incompetent partner. Also, airlines can implement and/or
terminate the agreement with great flexibility and,
moreover, negotiate only for guaranteed agreement terms.
For example, initiating a Special Prorate Agreement (SPA)
between a foreign and a U.S. airline has been popular.

It

allows the foreign airline to transport an international
passenger beyond its designated U.S. gateway or point of
entry.

In return, the U.S. carriers are able to transfer

these international passengers into their domestic route
system, thereby increasing their domestic traffic revenues.
However, if the specific U.S. airline were to impose an
unanticipated fare burden on the passenger of a foreign
airline, the foreign airline could negotiate for more
equitable terms with a different airline without suffering
any penalties.

A good example is the case between Thai

International Airlines and American Airlines.

Thai

International Airlines ceased their SPA with American
Airlines in 1992 and implemented an SPA with Delta Airlines
when Delta offered them a preferable discount rate for their
passengers.

Thus, if one airline were to realize that its

partner was not rendering service up to agreed standards, a

7
simple alliance can be unilaterally terminated.

Therefore,

a lack of commitment between two partners to sacrifice for
their mutual benefit is probably the biggest disadvantage of
a simple alliance.
Although a strong alliance is an extension of a simple
alliance, it is different in terms of capital investment
requirements.

Specifically, the capital investment of one

airline in the other exposes the investing airline to
substantial financial risk if the partner was to declare
bankruptcy.

In exchange, the benefits that can be obtained

through this particular agreement are far greater than from
the simple alliance.

The main benefit comes from the

greater degree of mutual commitment and dedication between
the two airlines.

Also, it is more difficult to terminate

the alliance, which creates a more permanent relationship.
In addition, the airlines can integrate their operations
more easily.

Examples of this integration are implementing

joint-service routes, sharing catering and fueling services,
utilizing a single aircraft maintenance facility, honoring
both frequent-flyer programs, and mutually investing,
allocating, and utilizing their computer reservation
systems.

All this coordination and integration can help

both airlines reduce their operating costs and improve their
competitive positions.
A corporate merger, the third form of alliance, can
present significant growth to the parent airline.

From a

8
merger, the dominate airline will acquire the capital and
the infrastructure (gates, slots, terminals, CRS) of the
former competitor, realize economies of scale, and, to a
degree, enjoy decreased competition.

Nevertheless, not all

elements of a corporate merger are beneficial.

The

possibility of depleting current assets and/or increasing
liability through the merging process must not be
overlooked.

If an uncontrollable external catastrophe was

to occur (fuel shortage crisis, war, conflicts with labor
unions, general downturn in the economy), the ability to
sustain the inflated size of the company could be far more
difficult to engineer than if the company was more modestly
sized.

In Table 1, the major advantages and disadvantages

of different airline alliance types are summarized.
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Table 1. A Summary of the Major Advantages and Disadvantages
of Different Airline Alliance Types
AIRLINE ALLIANCE
TYPES

MAJOR ADVANTAGES

MAJOR
DISADVANTAGES

SIMPLE ALLIANCE

* The ability to
sustain and
operate under
their own unique
corp. identity

* The relatively
s imp1e
terminating
procedures

* The absence of
financial burden
* The ability to
avoid financial
losses caused by
its partner

* The lack of
mutual commitment
to support and
sacrifice between
alliance partners

* The simplicity
of implementing
procedures
STRONG ALLIANCE

CORPORATE MERGER

* The presence of
mutual commitment
between alliance
partners

* The possibility
of financial
losses caused by
partner's failure

* The ability to
monetarily profit
from partner's
stock valuation

*The inability to
unilaterally
terminate the
alliance

* The ability to
increase market
share and decrease
competition

* The danger of
being inflexible
to market
fluctuations

* The ability to
attain a global
critical mass

* The financial
burden of
investment

* The
confrontation
with native
governments on
local anti-trust
regulations
Source: Shin, W. Oh. "A Study of Air Transport Marketing
Strategies" (Graduate Thesis, In-Ha University,
1991), pp. 80-84.
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B. The Goal of Forming An Alliance
The primary goal for forming an alliance is to provide
what the industry calls a "seamless product."

The seamless

product, within the context of air travel, requires the
ability of an air carrier alliance to provide service to
customers without their being aware that they are dealing
with more than one company.

Expressed in another way, it is

similar to "one stop shopping."

With one-stop shopping, the

customer is able to purchase a ticket to any destination
within the route system of the alliance as an "on-line"
alliance customer.

The customer will be served as if the

entire flight was carried out by one carrier, even if one or
more switches between carriers are made at intermediate
stops.

Hence, convenience in re-boarding procedures can be

realized by every air traveller.
In addition, alliances can help to attain political and
operational goals.

Politically, in order to circumvent the

current restrictive bilateral air service agreements in
place between nations, an alliance allows a foreign air
carrier to operate within a foreign country without waiting
for renegotiation of the bilateral air service agreement.
Operationally, efficiency can be achieved through sharing
infrastructure (gates, slots, terminals), service
departments (catering, fueling), and honoring mutual
promotional benefits.

Therefore, when all the elements of

the goals are aggregated, implementation of an alliance

11
should provide the respective airlines a competitive edge
over competing U.S. and/or international airlines.

C. Existing U.S. Alliances
Of all the U.S. domestic air carriers, the most active
carriers in negotiating corporate alliances with foreign
airlines are Delta and Northwest Airlines.

These two

carriers were ranked in 1992 as the third and fourth largest
air carriers in the U.S. in terms of passenger revenue
miles.

The main reasons these air carriers vigorously

pursue a corporate alliance are the added benefits of
network coverage, frequency competitiveness, and the
increased operational efficiency larger carriers enjoy
domestically and globally (American and United).7

These

two airlines, and with the recent addition of U.S. Air,
realize that the absence of a corporate alliance would only
allow them to be niche carriers competing in specific
markets.

In addition, a foreign monetary injection to some

airlines with a weak financial status could allow them to
maintain their competitive position in their respective
markets.

Hence, a corporate alliance has become an

important strategic tool to fulfill an objective of
sustaining competitiveness.

7

Michael Harrington and Torbjorn Kihlstedt, "Wedding
Night Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 13.
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The NW/KLM Alliance.

Northwest Airlines is currently

ranked the fourth largest carrier in the U.S. domestic air
transportation industry in terms of revenue passenger miles.
However, industry experts indicate that it is too highly
leveraged and must somehow expand both in the U.S. and
overseas if it is to have any chance of being competitive in
the global air transport industry.

In this respect,

Northwest Airlines, under CEO Al Checchi, initiated a
corporate alliance agreement with Dutch carrier KLM in 1989.
KLM invested $3.68 billion U.S. dollars in Northwest
Airlines.

In return, KLM holds 20% of Northwest's parent

company's (Wings Holding) common stock, which also
represents 20.5% of the voting stock.8
This alliance between Northwest and KLM enabled both
parties to mutually expand market links by using the
"seamless product" concept.

A vast on-line and single code

network ensured that a passenger is funnelled into the
Northwest/KLM system.

Also, being able to provide a more

convenient re-boarding procedure enhances their service
quality and benefits their overall advertising campaign.
Moreover, plans to integrate their sales operations will
allow both Northwest and KLM to market each other's
passenger and cargo operations, coordinate schedules, plan
joint strategic objectives, pool revenue, market third party

8

Jean Cole, "Northwest's Global Reach," Minnesota
Pioneer Press, 19 August 1992, p. E4.
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services, and share personnel.

This alliance has great

potential to increase the productivity and efficiency of
both carriers.
Other than the alliance with KLM, Northwest has also
aggressively sought to implement multiple alliances.

Table

2 provides the percentage figures of KLM and Northwest
Airlines' equity stake in other airlines.

In 1991,

Northwest made a bid for 80% of Philippine Airlines, for
more than $370 million U.S. dollars.

The rationale and

purpose of this alliance was to capitalize on Philippine
Airlines' extensive route network in Southeast Asia and to
establish a major maintenance facility in the Philippines.11
This alliance could provide Northwest with a significant
decrease in maintenance costs due to lower labor costs in
the Philippines, while Northwest would also have the
opportunity to enjoy a stake in the high traffic growth
rates in the Pacific air transport market.

However,

the

domestic U.S. airline unions oppose foreign repair stations,
and this has been the biggest hurdle in implementing the
alliance.
Northwest's vision of a global network also includes a
49% stake in Qantas Airways, an Australian carrier.
Northwest envisioned its current partner, KLM, and future
potential partners, Philippine Airlines and Qantas Airways,

q

Jean Cole, "Northwest's Global Reach," Minnesota
Pioneer Press, 19 August 19 91, p. E4.

14
as forming a global network of airlines that could surpass
the efficiency and productivity of all competitors in the
respective regions.
Although the intentions of Northwest are considered to
be sound, the issue of capacity has to be confronted and
solved by Northwest Airlines.

Compared to some other U.S.

megacarriers (United, American, and Delta) , Northwest is
currently limited in gates and slots.

Therefore, without

plans for expansion, Northwest would not be able to offer
its partner and future partners adequate access to U.S.
markets.

Northwest made plans to acquire

Midway Airlines

and become a prime contender in the bidding process for
Continental.

Unfortunately, the U.S. airline industry has

experienced a severe downturn in the 1990s.

Once dominant

megacarriers, such as American and United Airlines, have
recorded staggering financial losses, and Northwest is not
an exception.

Hence, the required financial muscle for

Northwest to make the needed expansion has to come from
external sources at this time.
KLM is currently seeking an alliance with British
Airways.

If the proposed alliance takes place, Northwest

would indirectly benefit by being able to receive the needed
capital for expansion, plus an extended network of
international routes.

If all the anticipated alliances and

the desired growth of Northwest are successful, Northwest
will certainly be in a position as one of the leaders in the

15
U.S. and the global air transport industry.

Table 2. KLM and Northwest Airlines' Equity Stakes
CARRIER

PARTNER

CARRIER'S EQUITY
in PARTNER (%)

KLM

Air UK

14.9

MARTINAIR

29.8

KLM CITYHOPPER

100

NORTHWEST

20

TRANSAVIA

40

HAWAIIAN

25

PHILIPPINE *

80

QANTAS *

49

NORTHWEST

* Potential alliance partners
Source:

M. Harrington and T. Kihlstedt, "Wedding Night
Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 17.

Delta's Alliances.

In order to maintain their position

as the third largest air carrier in the U.S. domestic air
transport industry (in terms of revenue passenger miles in
1992) and to maintain their competitiveness in the global
air transport industry, Delta Airlines set up a threeairline alliance network with Swissair and Singapore
Airlines in 1989.

This particular alliance is a strong

alliance involving equity swaps among the three carriers.
Delta obtained a five percent equity stake in Swissair and a
three percent equity stake in Singapore Airlines.

Singapore

16
Airlines secured five percent of Delta and three percent of
Swissair, while Swissair acquired five percent of Delta and
one percent of Singapore Airlines' stocks.

Table 3 shows

Delta Airlines' alliance activity.
Although the initial process of building global linkups
between international carriers was forecast to be complex
and time consuming (due to the difficulty of integrating
different computer systems, flight schedules, and corporate
cultures), the three airlines aggressively developed the
alliance.

The benefits of integrating three carriers that

serve three different yet important markets (U.S., Europe,
and Pacific) were projected by all respective carriers to
provide concrete dividends and efficiency.

An advantage of

this alliance was that it provided an opportunity for these
three carriers to offer a seamless product to international
air travellers having beyond point-of-entry destinations.
Delta Airlines extended Swissair and Singapore Airlines
rights to a priority display on its international
reservation system to generate more traffic.

Hence, the

ability to offer better service in terms of increased
frequencies, more worldwide destinations, and enhanced
convenience and comfort for international travellers (from
simplifying the re-boarding procedures) has put the three
airlines in a more competitive position in the global air
transport industry.

Moreover, the capability to create more

traffic demand from the industry by using favorable
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reservation displays has added to the benefits of the three
airlines.

Additionally, joint use of aircraft and personnel

between Swissair and Singapore Airlines, joint flights,
revenue pooling, sharing maintenance facilities, and
enhanced communication links between the three carriers were
cost saving gains of this particular alliance.
If the implemented alliance was to mature and develop
a stronger tie, the three carriers would be able to attain
critical mass, increase international network coverage,
reduce operating costs, and become more efficient globally,
which will eventually impose significant threats to the U.S.
megacarriers and some other international carriers.

Table 3. Delta Airlines' Equity Stake
CARRIER

PARTNER

DELTA

SINGAPORE

2.8

SWISSAIR

5

Source:

EQUITY

(%)

M. Harrington and T. Kihlstedt, "Wedding Night
Jitters," Airline Business, December 1991, p. 17.

USAir Alliance.

Although USAir is ranked as the fourth

largest air carrier in the U.S. domestic air transport
market (in terms of revenue passenger miles) in 1992, USAir
is currently operating without a significant stake in the
international aviation market.

Therefore, USAir's success

is heavily dependant upon two elements: traffic volume

18
growth in the U.S. domestic air transport market and the
competition in its domestic markets.

Unfortunately, in the

1990s, the U.S. domestic air transport market has been
growing slowly and has also been extremely competitive.
Consequently, USAir has lost more than one billion U.S.
dollars before taxes in the last two years.10

In addition,

severe price competition has reduced yields and the
profitability of the U.S. air transport industry overall,
leaving USAir with a total debt of more than two billion
U.S. dollars.

The only carrier that has remained profitable

is Southwest Airlines, which is considered a niche carrier
in the U.S. domestic air transport market.11
Unlike Southwest, USAir competes directly against major
U.S. carriers and airlines operating under Chapter XI
bankruptcy protection.

Hence, USAir is at a disadvantage

competing against carriers that can off-set their domestic
losses with international revenues and carriers who can
offer fares that are below marginal costs (TWA, Continental,
and America West) .12
In devising a survival strategy, USAir chose to seek
corporate alliances with foreign airlines.

The alliance

10

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30.
n

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30.
12

David Cammeron, "Every Questions Answered," Airline
Business, April 1992, p. 51.
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benefits expected by USAir are a much needed injection of
capital and the generation of traffic feed from its
partner's international hub to USAir's domestic hub.

In

return, USAir's position of being the largest carrier (by
departures) at Boston, New York/La Guardia, Philadelphia,
Washington National, Charlotte, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis,
and Tampa provided prominent leverage to international
carriers seeking feed in the north-eastern U.S. markets.13
In addition, considering the absence of international
service rights by USAir, an alliance partner's worry about
servicing redundant international routes would not exist,
which makes an alliance more appealing to any international
carrier.
In 1992, USAir initiated a simple alliance with Air
Canada to promote joint fares, implement marketing
coordination, enforce code sharing, and integrate frequent
flyer programs.

The agreement also contained a pledge to

change the simple alliance into a strong alliance in the
future, which will enable both airlines to offer joint
purchasing rights for equipment, share maintenance, gates,
slots and technical facilities, and an equity swap.

The

benefit gained by both carriers was mutually increased
traffic feed from one's hub to the other's.
Apart from the simple alliance with Air Canada, USAir

n

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30.
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is on the verge of inaugurating a strong alliance with
British Airlines.

British Airlines has offered USAir an

investment of $750 million.

In return, BA will obtain 44%

of USAir's capital share and 21% voting rights.14

If the

proposed alliance takes place, the potential benefit for
both airlines will be the ability to offer a seamless
product.

Secondly, cost savings can be realized by both

carriers through joint purchasing, catering, and sharing of
structural facilities and personnel.

Since the combined

annual operating costs for both airlines exceeds $14
billion, a potential 1% reduction in cost can mount up to
$140 million; in the long run, there is the possibility of a
gradual increase, percentage wise.15
USAir's plan for implementing an alliance with BA is
currently experiencing severe challenges from its
competitors.

United, American, and Delta Airlines are

strongly opposed to the alliance.

They contend that putting

BA and USAir together would create the world's largest
airline by passenger numbers, with 80 million passengers
carried in 1991.

Also, the issue of cabotage is an element

raised by USAir's competitors.

The competition claims that

the USAir/BA alliance will indirectly allow BA to get around
the current restrictive U.S. cabotage rights.

Therefore,

14

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30.
15

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 31.
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without an equitable exchange of rights such as allowing
U.S. carriers to operate within Europe, these competing
carriers argue that the alliance between USAir and BA must
be stopped by the U.S. government.

USAir and its 45,000

employees have a different perspective.

They insist that

the proposed alliance should be granted by the U.S.
Department of Transportation based on two reasons.

First,

if the proposed alliance is denied, the ability of USAir to
survive in the current competitive U.S. domestic air
transport market is questionable.

Second, the job security

of its 45,000 employees will be in jeopardy.16

D. Challenges of Alliances
The benefits of implementing an alliance between some
U.S. airlines and other international carriers would be
positive for the respective airlines for a variety of
reasons.

These include reduced costs, increased efficiency,

better utilization of resources, and enhanced service
quality for international passengers.

However, there are

external and internal challenges associated with an
alliance.
Externally, the respective governments have the power
to veto any alliance agreement in order to protect the
interests of their national or flag carrier.

lb

Since an

Mead Jennings, "BA Stakes Out USAir," Airline
Business, August 19 92, p. 10.
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alliance agreement between a U.S. and a foreign air carrier
enables the foreign carrier to legally transport U.S.
passengers domestically and internationally, the U.S.
government imposes restrictions to limit the alliance
agreements.

For example, Korean Airlines negotiated a Code

Sharing Agreement with TWA in 1990 to transport U.S.
passengers from Honolulu to Los Angeles.

Without a Code

Sharing Agreement, offering services on this particular
route is illegal for Korean Airlines.

A popular tactic used

by the U.S. government to restrict the alliance formation
process is to invoke anti-trust laws.

The coordination of

prices between airline partners in an alliance is a direct
violation of U.S. anti-trust laws.

In addition, limiting

foreign ownership of U.S. airlines is another method of
restricting alliances.

Presently, 49%

foreign ownership of

a U.S. carrier is allowed with no more than 25% voting
rights and no more than one third foreign representation on
the U.S. firm's board of directors.17

Other foreign

governments impose even stricter foreign ownership
limitations, except for Australia.

The Australian

government has foreign ownership limitation laws identical
to those of the U.S.

On the other hand, the Japanese

government does not allow a foreign corporation to invest in
a Japanese firm, while the British government imposes a

17

Mead Jennings, "BA Stakes Out USAir," Airline
Business, August 1992, p. 10.
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significantly more restrictive foreign investment law (25%
foreign ownership and no more than 10% voting rights).18
The intentions of all these restrictions by local
governments is to simultaneously protect the local industry
from foreign penetration and to provide leverage for their
local air carriers to obtain favorable terms from other
governments with more liberal policies and more global
distribution possibilities.
Apart from governmental challenges, another external
difficulty of implementing an alliance is the objection from
competitors and labor unions.

The recent alliance

discussions between BA and USAir are an excellent example.
Bob Crandall, the CEO of American Airlines, has stated that
he had serious intentions of putting American Airlines up
for sale if the proposed alliance were to go through.
rationale behind his statement is twofold.

The

First, he fears

that permitting the deal will provide his competitors
considerable market benefits, assuming the proposed alliance
can be made to function effectively.

Second, it is a way to

register a complaint regarding his inability to undertake
similar investments in European carriers, although the rules
have yet to be tested by a real bid.

Moreover, the

inability of American Airlines to obtain increased traffic
rights beyond the UK has been a significant factor in its

18

"BA-USAir Forces Another Bermuda," Airline Business,
November 1992, p.7.
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complaints.

Crandall insists that the U.S. DOT (Department

of Transportation) must secure equal opportunities for U.S.
carriers, through amending the existing bilateral air
agreement between the U.K. and the U.S., before the proposed
alliance is approved.

Crandall would like new U.S. gateways

to London; allowing U.S. carriers as many routes out of
Heathrow as U.K. carriers have; unlimited access to
secondary U.K. cities; more liberal capacity and fares
control; more beyond rights; reciprocal opportunities to buy
into U.K. carriers; and better access to slots at
Heathrow.1"

In this sense, Crandall's view has validity if

market access is the critical issue; therefore, his position
becomes one of the hurdles of an alliance.

However,

Crandall's fear of his competition becoming more productive
through an alliance is considered as merely an insecurity
factor fueling his strong opposing view of an alliance.
The airline labor unions are also strongly opposed to
these types of alliances.

They claim that their jobs would

be lost if they had to compete against some foreign labor
rates that are considerably lower than theirs.

Any form of

an alliance that enables airlines to share personnel and
structural facilities, such as maintenance, catering, and
ticketing facilities, could indeed affect job security and
the viability of U.S. airline labor unions.

1C)

Consequently,

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines Oppose
BA's US Deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p. 30.
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the airline labor unions are actively lobbying governmental
regulatory groups to block any proposed alliances between
U.S. and foreign airlines.
Another alliance challenge is the probable internal
conflict between the alliance partners.

The dispute over

national pride, ownership, conservatism, and the belief in
the "our way of doing things is best" concept has a major
effect on the viability of an alliance.

Although most

airline managers would find merit in an alliance which would
leave them in a leading role in the global air transport
industry, in international markets, equal partnerships are
noted to be difficult to forge and even harder to sustain.
Therefore, resistance to transborder acquisitions will be
particularly high when the forces of nationalism are brought
to bear.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHOD and ANALYSIS

A. Rationale for Using a Regression Model
Although this thesis has qualitatively discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of implementing an alliance,
the student wanted to test and evaluate alliances using a
quantitative analytical technique. A regression analysis was
used to study whether implementing an alliance has any
measurable quantitative gains and/or losses for the
respective airlines.
In the regression model, the student hypothesized that
the aggregate traffic revenue of KLM would increase,
depending on the increased number of U.S. domestic
destinations gained from a corporate alliance with Northwest
Airlines.

Therefore, the prediction of increased traffic

revenue can be quantified once the number of increased
destinations has been established.

In this regression

model, KLM's traffic revenue is designated as the dependant
variable and the number of destinations as an independent
variable.

Thus, the numerical benefit and/or cost of an

alliance in terms of traffic revenue can be tested and
26
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measured.
A regression analysis enables the student to quantify
the increase or decrease in KLM's traffic revenue by taking
the increased number of destinations into account.

However,

predictions of the dependant variable (KLM'S traffic
revenue) based on a model containing only a single
independent variable (number of destinations) may be too
simplistic.

For example, the gross domestic product (GDP)

of the Netherlands, the currency exchange rate between the
U.S. and the Netherlands, the available seat miles (ASM) of
KLM, and the fare levels of KLM could pose a significant
influence over the changes in KLM's traffic revenue.

Hence,

a multiple regression analysis which considers more
independent variables should provide a more precise
quantitative prediction of the dependant variable, KLM's
traffic revenue.
In summary, assuming that alliances are beneficial
overall, the student would expect the multiple regression
model to show that KLM's traffic revenues increased after
the alliance.

B. Regression Model

Model Variables and Data Sources.

The KLM/Northwest

Airlines alliance was selected as a case analysis for this
thesis.

The main reason is that KLM and Northwest Airlines
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were the first major airlines to develop a strong alliance
in 1989.

Prior to the alliance between KLM and Northwest

Airlines, there were simple alliances between various
international carriers.

However, the goal of this project

was to use a strong alliance as a study case and to perform
a regression analysis of this alliance in order to quantify
the benefits of such a permanent alliance.

Therefore, a

simple alliance which entails agreements such as joint
marketing, code-sharing, and joint pooling was not selected
since it is not as long lasting or substantial.

Simple

alliances can be easily terminated unilaterally depending on
the needs of a particular airline.
For the multiple regression analysis, KLM's aggregate
semi-annual traffic revenue was chosen as the dependant
variable. The U.S. GDP growth rate, the currency exchange
rate between Netherlands Guilders and U.S. cents, KLM's
average one-way economy fare from Amsterdam to St. Paul/
"Minneapolis, and the number of KLM's U.S. gates from 1986 to
1991 were selected to be the independent variables.

That

is, the student wanted to investigate whether KLM's traffic
revenue would respond to changes in the U.S. GDP growth
rate, U.S. domestic destinations, KLM's fare levels, and the
currency exchange rate between Netherlands guilders and U.S.
cents.

The sample years from 1986 to 1991 were specifically

selected to allow a "before and after" alliance comparison.
To be more precise, the student wanted to study whether
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KLM's traffic revenue increased after its alliance with
Northwest Airlines in 1989.
KLM's aggregate traffic revenue, currency conversion
rates between Netherlands and the U.S., and the number of
KLM's U.S. gates were obtained primarily from the annual
financial reports of KLM and Northwest Airlines.

The U.S.

GDP growth rate data are published by the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis.

Data on KLM's average economy fare from

Amsterdam, Netherlands to St. Paul/Minneapolis were acquired
from Assistant Manager Jackie Thon, who currently works for
the International Tariff Department at the U.S. Department
of Transportation, located in Washington D.C.
In Table 4, the number of KLM's U.S. gates remained the
same from 1986 through 1988.

With the addition of

Baltimore, Orlando, and Halifax, it increased to thirteen in
1989.

However, after the alliance with Northwest Airlines,

it dramatically increased to 211.

Most of these 211 U.S.

gates are served by Northwest Airlines.
The U.S. GDP growth rate increased steadily from 1986
through 1988.

The highest growth percentage rate reached

7.9% in 1988.

But from 1989 it decreased, falling to its

lowest growth rate of 2.9% in 1991.

The downturn of the

U.S. economy and the decrease in consumer demand confidence
are the major contributing factors to this decrease.
The currency exchange rate from 1986 through 1991
fluctuated constantly around a general growth trend.
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Therefore, a regular or predictable growth pattern or cycle
cannot be observed.

The inability to control the value of

U.S. currency in international markets and the inability to
predict global political changes are reasons for the
inconsistent fluctuations in the currency exchange rate
between the U.S. and the Netherlands.
The one-way economy fare charged by KLM from 1986
through 1991 increased on a semi-annual basis.

The two

biggest increases were in 1990 (11%) and in 1991 (13%) .
However, the KLM fare shown in Table 4 is only one out of
more than 150 fares offered by KLM from the Netherlands to
the U.S.

The results of the regression model will be

affected by the necessity of selecting one fare to represent
the "price" of the air service.
KLM's traffic revenue increased in 1987, 1989, 1990 and
decreased in 1988 and 1991 with respect to the previous
years.
22%).

The biggest increase was in 1989 and 1990 (14% and
The major influence of this increase seems to be the

changes in the number of KLM's U.S. gates.

In 1989, there

was an increase of three gates and in 1990, there was an
increase of almost 200.

Although the number of gates

remained the same in 1991, KLM's traffic revenue decreased
by 12% compared to the figures in 1990.

A significant

decrease in the U.S. GDP growth rate can be considered the
prime factor for this decrease.
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Table 4. Summary of the Data Used for the Regression
Analysis
YEAR

TRAFFIC

NUMBER

U.S. GDP

CURRENCY

KLM's

REVENUE

OF GATES

GROWTH

RATE

FARE

(cents /

(US $)

(Mil.$)

(%)

guilder)
JUNE 86

833

10

5.7%

40.4

$ 815

DEC. 86

834

10

5.7%

45.6

$ 850

JUNE 87

934

10

6.4%

48.6

$ 850

DEC. 87

935

10

6.4%

56.3

$ 875

JUNE 88

878

10

7.9%

48.7

$ 900

DEC. 88

878

10

7.9%

50.0

$ 900

JUNE 89

1003

13

7.0%

45.4

$ 915

DEC. 89

1003

13

7.0%

52.2

$ 950

JUNE 9 0

1226

211

5.1%

53.2

$ 995

DEC. 90

1227

211

5.1%

59.2

$1055

JUNE 91

1084

211

2.9%

51.7

$1129

DEC. 91

1084

211

2.9%

51.7

$1197

Source (Traffic Revenue)
(Gates)
(GDP)
(Currency Rate)
(KLM's Fare)

KLM's Annual Financial reports.
NW/KLM's Annual Financial reports
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
KLM's annual Financial Report.
J. Thon, U.S. Department of
Transportation
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Regression Model Calibration.

To investigate whether

KLM's traffic revenue will increase after an alliance with
Northwest Airlines, a correlation analysis was included in
the regression analysis.

KLM's aggregate traffic revenue

was set as the dependant variable with the number of U.S.
gates set as an independent variable.
However, realizing that a single independent variable
may not render reliable regression results, other
independent variables were added to obtain a better fit or
explanation of the dependant variable (KLM's traffic
revenue).

Consequently, the student chose the U.S. GDP

growth rate, KLM's average economy fare from Amsterdam,
Netherlands, to St. Paul/Minneapolis, and the currency
exchange rate between U.S. cents and Netherlands Guilders as
the other independent variables.
The reason for selecting these variables was to offset
the overstatement of KLM's traffic revenue.

To be more

precise, the student hypothesized that a healthy U.S.
economy could create the big possibility of inducing more
leisure traffic demand through increased disposable income
by every citizen.

Furthermore, higher fare levels for every

KLM passenger could increase the operational yield,
increasing the actual amount of traffic revenue.

Lastly, a

favorable foreign exchange rate between the Netherlands and
the U.S. could also increase the actual traffic revenue.
Hence, the student concluded that the aforementioned
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variables must be included in the regression analysis in
order to eliminate the possibility of overstating KLM's
traffic revenue, and to obtain a more accurate correlation
relationship between the traffic revenue and the number of
increased gates.
By performing a regression analysis with these
variables, the goal was to obtain a correlation coefficient
that shows a statistically significant relationship between
the dependant and the independent variables.

For example,

if the coefficient between traffic revenue and gates
resulted in a -1.00, this would mean that traffic revenue is
inversely related to the number of gates; therefore, traffic
revenue would decrease when the number of gates increases.
On the other hand, a coefficient of +1.00 suggests that
traffic revenue will increase with an increased number of
gates.

T-Statistics were used to investigate whether the

regression coefficients were statistically significant based
on the sample size or simply due to chance.
The student used two investigative instruments to
calibrate the regression model.

One was the Lotus 1-2-3

Release 2.2 and the other was the Stat + software program.
Both programs were used for running the regression analysis
and obtaining outputs.
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C. Analysis of the Regression Model and Findings
The study of a multiple regression analysis contains
various objectives.

It can be used to forecast traffic

revenues and/or can be utilized to test a quantitative
relationship between variables.

In this thesis, the

multiple regression analysis is used to investigate the
quantitative relationship between the dependant and the
independent variables.

However, it is crucial to note that

this investigation does not prove the cause and effect
between the variables.

The specific regression elements the

student wishes to uncover are the correlation coefficient of
the dependant and the independent variables, the constant
for the regression equation, the coefficients of every
independent variables, and the T-Statistic ratios for every
independent variable.

Before analyzing the results of the

multiple regression, the student will list and define the
outputs of the multiple regression analysis.

The regression equation obtained through the multiple
regression analysis is as follows :

Yi = 521.77 + 5.29X1 + 1.61X2 + 30.96X3 - 0.10X4 + E
Yi
XI
X2
X3
X4

=
=
=
=
=

The dependant variable (KLM's traffic revenue)
Number of KLM's U.S. gates
Currency exchange rate
U.S. GDP growth rate
KLM's average economy fare
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The calibrated equation can be used to predict the
changes in KLM's traffic revenue by inserting values for the
independent variables.

However, the logic of this model

must be defined first.

In this particular model, the

student hypothesized that KLM's traffic revenue will
fluctuate depending upon a corporate alliance with Northwest
Airlines.

Therefore, if one can measure or represent a

corporate alliance using the four independent variables
(X1,X2,X3,X4), then the model suggests that KLM's traffic
revenue would increase upon the increase of all the
independent variables, except for KLM's average economy
fare.
There may be an inverse relationship between fare level
and traffic revenue.

Rigas Doganis theorizes that "the

relationship between price changes and the demand for air
travel can be measured by the price elasticity of
demand."20

Using this price elasticity of demand theory,

KLM's total traffic revenue will decrease as the fares
charged by KLM increase when the overall demand is elastic.
The regression equation supports this finding as traffic
revenue (Yi) is inversely related to fares (X4). Therefore,
if the overall demand is elastic, the findings of the
regression equation are correct.

However, if the overall

demand is inelastic, the results of the regression equation
20

Rigas Doganis, "Airline Marketing - The Role of Passenger
Demand," Flying Off Course, (New York: Routledge, Chapman, and
Hall, 1992), p. 221.
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can be distorted.

A more thorough analysis of the

regression results must be performed to draw any conclusions
of the regression model.
In Table 5, the constant value of 521.77 indicates the
value of the dependant variable's Y-intercept.

To be more

specific, the dependant variable equals the constant when
all independent variables equal zero.

Table 5. Regression Analysis Output
CONSTANT

521.77

Std. Err. of Y Est.

63.60

R SQUARED

0.87

No. of OBSERVATIONS

12

DEGREES of FREEDOM

7

The Standard Error of Estimate (+/- 63.6 million
dollars) provides the changes in the regression formula's
estimate of KLM's traffic revenue.

The lower the standard

error of estimate, the better the regression equation is at
predicting the actual value of the dependant variable.
The R Squared for the multiple regression is 0.87 or
87%.

Generally, R Squared values in excess of 0.90 or 90%

are preferred.

The R Squared value of 87% suggests a strong

relationship between the variations of the dependant and the
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chosen independent variables.

To be more precise, 87% of

KLM's variations in traffic revenue can be explained by the
variations of the independent variables,

which are the

growth of U.S. GDP, KLM's average economy fare, number of
KLM's U.S. gates, and the currency exchange rate between the
U.S. and the Netherlands.

The remaining 13% affecting the

outcome of the variations in KLM's traffic revenue may come
from other external and/or internal influences, such as
KLM's in-flight service quality levels and/or degree of
commitment to advertising expenditures.
Another statistic used to evaluate the overall
significance of a regression equation is the F Statistic.
For a small sample size, it is a more useful measure than
the R Squared.

For the regression equation, the value of

the F Statistic is 11.22.

Considering the degrees of

freedom (7), the number of observations (12), and the
confidence level (95%), the F Statistic value must exceed
3.09 to imply that the equation as a whole is significant.
Therefore, a F Statistic value of 11.26 indicates that the
calculated regression equation as a whole is significant for
this particular regression model.
Table 6 gives the residual values of the dependant
variable (KLM's traffic revenue).

The residual is the

difference between the actual reported KLM traffic revenue
and the values calculated or estimated by the regression
equation.

Ideally, residual values should satisfy the
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Table 6. Residual Values for the Dependant Variable
YEAR

RESIDUAL VALUE

JUNE 1986

-9.40

DECEMBER 1986

-33.26

JUNE 1987

30.22

DECEMBER 19 87

-7.90

JUNE 1988

-68.03

DECEMBER 19 88

-74.91

JUNE 1989

99.02

DECEMBER 1989

66.72

JUNE 1990

30.11

DECEMBER 19 9 0

4.64

JUNE 1991

-22 .20

DECEMBER 1991

-15.10

homoscedasticity assumption which says that the variance of
the actual and calculated values are constant over the
entire range of the dependant variable.
appear to be heteroscedastic.
given in Appendix A.

The residual values

The analysis of residuals is

Heteroscedasticity occurs when the

variances of the residuals either increases or decreases
over the range of the dependent variables.

The results

suggest the regression equation is not as robust or reliable
as possible.

The small number of observations may have

contributed to this result.
An autocorrelation analysis can be used to determine if
the R Squared of the regression equation is artificially
inflated or if the residuals are correlated with each other.
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If the residuals are autocorrelated, the strength of the
relationship between the dependant and the independent
variables may be exaggerated.

The Durbin-Watson statistic

is used to test for autocorrelation of residuals.

In this

regression model, the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic
is 1.55.

A Durbin-Watson value of 1.5 suggests there is no

autocorrelation present in the regression model.

Therefore,

the student's regression model is not autocorrelated.
However, a more detailed analysis with more observations is
recommended since the Durbin-Watson statistic value (1.55)
is borderline.
Table 7 provides the T-Statistic values for all of the
selected independent variables.

The procedure for

interpreting these values involves a hypothesis testing
procedure.

The initial stage is to utilize and examine a

table that displays how large a coefficient needs to be in
order to be significant at a given probability level.

A

confidence level of 95%, or an alpha level of +/- 5%,
implying the probability of a Type I error is +/- 5%, was
used to analyze the regression coefficients.

Hence, the

numerical T- Statistic value for every independent variable
of this regression must exceed +/- 1.89 (two tailed test) to
reject the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient
is equal to zero.

Table 7 reveals that the only independent

variable that provides a T-Statistic value that is
statistically significant is the number of KLM's U.S gates,
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Table 7. Regression Coefficient and T Statistics
X VARBLS.

XI

X2

X3

X4

OUTPUT

GATES

CURRENCY

GDP

FARE

X Coef.

5.29

1.61

30.96

-0.10

Std. Err.

5.24

0.51

23.55

0.35

3 .17

1.32

1.01

-0.30

of Coef.
T Stat.

with a T-Statistic value of 3.17.

The variations in the

U.S. economic growth rate, KLM's fare structure, and the
currency exchange rate between the U.S. and the Netherlands
are not statistically significant with respect to the
variations of KLM's traffic revenue.
Based on the regression analysis findings, the
variations in the number of KLM's U.S. gates seems to have
an influence on the variations of KLM's traffic revenue.
However, variations of the other independent variables have
an inconclusive impact on the variations of KLM's traffic
revenue.

There could be numerous reasons for this.

First, the numerical fluctuations of the independent
variables, besides the number of KLM's U.S. gates, could
have been too severe considering the relatively short time
span of the observations.
4.

This point can be seen in Table

The values of the GDP and the currency rates do not have
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consistent trends; therefore, a regular or predictable
growth pattern or cycle cannot be observed.

Hence, the

small number of observations probably reduced the
statistical significance of the two variables.

If the study

were to observe at least two or more economic cycles and
divide it into quarterly observations (32 observations),
higher T-Statistic values would be expected for the
remaining independent variables, including KLM's U.S. number
of gates.
To supplement the study of the correlation relationship
between the dependant and the independent variables, the
results of the correlation matrix have been calculated and
are shown in Table 8.

The purpose of this correlation

matrix is to study multicollinearity, or the correlation
relationship between the dependant and the independent
variables, and also the relationship between the independent
variables.
When referring to Table 8, the correlation between the
dependant and the independent variables shows a strong
positive relationship except for GDP.

GDP has a negative

relationship with the dependant variable (-0.54).
Generally, correlation coefficients of at least +/- 0.60 are
considered strong enough to be included in the model.

This

finding supports the theory that the variations of KLM's
traffic revenue can be explained by the variations of the
independent variables.

However, the negative relationship
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between KLM's traffic revenue and GDP is hard to explain,
When looking at the regression equation, the only

Table 8. Correlation Matrix
VRBLS

REV.

GATES

GDP

CRNCY.

FARE

REV.

1.00

0.87

-0.54

0.69

0.73

GATES

0.87

1.00

-0.82

0.54

0.88

-0.54

-0.82

1.00

-0.22

-0.77

CRNCY.

0.69

0.54

-0.22

1.00

0.52

FARE

0.73

0.88

-0.77

0.52

1.00

GDP

independent variable having an inverse relationship is KLM's
fare level, not the GDP.
The second use of the correlation matrix is to test for
multicollinearity or if there are any strong correlations
among the independent variables.

If a multicollinearity

relationship exists between the independent variables, the
overall regression results can be ambiguous.21

Generally,

correlations that are 80% or higher are considered
unacceptable.22

Referring to Table 8, gates and GDP (-

0.82), gates and fare (+0.88), and GDP and fares (-0.77) are
strongly correlated to each other.

Therefore, the student

21

Bertram Price and Samprit Chatterjee, "Analysis of
Collinear Data," Regression Analysis by Example (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1991), p. 173.
22

Donald R. Cooper and William C. Emory, "Multivariate
Analysis:An Overview," Business Research Methods (Boston, MA.:
Richard D. Irwin, 1991), p. 634.
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must exercise extreme caution about drawing any substantive
conclusions based on a regression analysis in the presence
of multicollinearity.

A strategy to overcome this result is

to delete KLM's fare from the regression model or substitute
a new variable.

However, it is important to know that

multicollinearity is not a modeling error.
condition of deficient data.

It is a

In the sub section titled

"Model Variables and Data Sources", the limitations of
selecting KLM's fare level was introduced.

Based on the

given circumstance, it is not practical or possible to
improve or change the data.

Therefore, the student feels

that focusing on conscious interpretation of the given data
and the regression results is the most effective method of
analysis.
This multiple regression analysis suggests that a
substantial proportion of the variations in KLM's traffic
revenue can be explained by the variations of KLM's number
of U.S. gates.

Furthermore, this underlying fact is

statistically significant, as proven by the acceptable TStatistic value.

Therefore, one can conclude that KLM's

traffic revenue will increase as it increases its access to
U.S. gates.

Hence, implementing a corporate alliance with

the Northwest Airlines seems to have benefitted KLM in terms
of traffic revenue.
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D-

Critical Evaluation of the Analysis and the Study's
Limitations
The student investigated the benefits of a strong

corporate alliance between KLM and Northwest Airlines using
a multiple regression analysis.

The reported results

generally support the logical expectation or widely accepted
view that alliances are beneficial.

However, the results

are not as strong or robust as the writer would prefer.
First, a corporate alliance is one of the most modern,
if not the newest, trend in the global air transport
industry.

Therefore, it is difficult to obtain a long time

series of data involving corporate alliances between
international airlines.

The only quantitative study of the

numerical benefit(s) of an alliance(s) available was
reported by Richard Whitaker and Mead Jennings in an Airline
Business article that dealt with the proposed alliance
between the British Airways and USAir.

They estimated that

cost savings of more than one percent can be achieved
through a corporate alliance between British Airways and
USAir ranging from "purchasing to yield management and from
catering to engineering which could result to the sum of
more than $14 billion U.S. dollars for both carriers".23
However, there are internal studies done by the airlines to
investigate the quantitative benefits of an alliance, but

23

Mead Jennings and Richard Whitaker, "Airlines oppose BA's
and US deal," Airline Business, September 1992, p.31.
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public access to those findings is restricted.

In summary,

there is little published, hard quantitative evidence to
support or disprove the value of a corporate alliance, or to
express its value in quantitative terms.
Second, obtaining financial information to conduct a
quantitative study on a corporate alliance(s) is difficult
because it involves sensitive, proprietary internal
information.

For example, load-factor figures on KLM's

flights between St. Paul/Minneapolis and Amsterdam,
Netherlands, were requested from KLM but were not provided,
for competitive reasons.

Therefore, the student had to

conduct his quantitative study relying solely on publicly
available financial information.

For example, to study

whether the variations in KLM's traffic revenue can be
explained by the variations in the independent variables,
KLM's traffic revenue figures should have only included the
traffic revenue generated from the U.S.
were not available.

But, these figures

As a result, the correlation between

the dependant and the independent variables could be over or
understated utilizing KLM's total traffic revenue.

To be

more specific, we do not know how much of KLM's overall
traffic revenue was generated by the St.Paul/Minneapolis and
Amsterdam route, specifically.

If the majority of KLM's

traffic revenues were produced by the U.S. market, the R
Squared between the dependant and the independent variables
should be larger.

Hence, the regression model may have
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distorted results.
The average economy fare, one of the independent
variables, is also difficult to establish or measure.

There

are more than 150 different fare levels on this particular
route.

For simplicity, an average economy fare was selected

to represent all of the fares charged.

However, if a

different fare were chosen from the 150, a different result
might have been produced.
Another element complicating the quantitative analysis
is' the inability to quantify the added benefits of a
corporate alliance(s).

As the literature review reveals,

the "seamless product" concept may contribute numerous
intangible benefits in addition to the increase in traffic
revenue for the respective airlines.

For example, the

loyalty for selecting KLM and/or Northwest Airlines over
other competitors can be enhanced from the existing and
potential demand due to the increase in passenger
convenience.

Hence, the dependant variable of KLM's traffic

revenue may have a strong correlation with other independent
variables not included in the regression analysis.
Finally, the values used to study KLM's quantitative
alliance benefits with Northwest Airlines begins from 1990.
Consequently, the number of needed observations to run an
effective multiple regression analysis turned out to be much
less than the student initially desired.
the analysis of the T-Statistics.

This shows up in

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY

A. Summary of Findings
There are three forms of airline alliances; these are:
simple alliance, strong alliance, and corporate merger.

The

three alliances are differentiated depending upon the amount
of capital investment and the variation in the form of the
functional agreements between airlines.
The three types of alliances present different
advantages and disadvantages for airlines seeking to use an
alliance as a corporate strategy to compete domestically
and/or globally.

Therefore, each airline must conduct a

careful analysis to determine its needs and circumstances
before implementing a particular alliance.
The student used a regression analysis to study whether
implementing an alliance has any measurable quantitative
gains or losses for the respective airlines.

The

KLM/Northwest Airlines alliance was selected as a case
analysis.

The main reason is that KLM and Northwest

Airlines were the first major airlines to develop a strong
alliance in 1989.
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For the regression model, KLM's aggregate semi-annual
traffic revenue was chosen as the dependant variable.

The

independent variables consisted of U.S. GDP growth rate, the
currency exchange rate between Netherlands Guilders and U.S.
cents, KLM's average one-way economy fare from Amsterdam to
St. Paul/Minneapolis, and the number of KLM's U.S. gates
from 1986 to 1991.
In this thesis, the regression equation suggests that
KLM's traffic revenue will increase as all the independent
variables increase, except for KLM's average economy fare.
There seem to be an inverse relationship between fare level
and traffic revenue due to elasticity of demand.
The regression equation is significant based on R
Squared and the F statistic.
and the F Statistic is 11.22.

The R Squared is 0.87 or 87%
However, the residual values

of the dependant variable suggest that the regression
equation is not as robust or reliable as desired.

This is

because the residual values appear to be heteroscedastic.
The regression model is not autocorrelated since the
Durbin-Watson statistic value is 1.55.

This implies that

the R Squared of the regression equation is not artificially
inflated and the residuals of the dependant variables are
not correlated to each other.
The T-statistic values imply that thr number of KLM's
U.S. gates is the only independent variable that is
statistically significant (3.17).

The other independent
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variables have an inconclusive impact on the variations of
KLM's traffic revenue.
The correlation matrix provides information that shows
a multicollinearity relationship between gates and GDP, fare
and gates, and GDP and fares.

If a multicollinearity

relationship exists between the independent variables, the
overall regression results can be ambiguous.
does not mean that there is a modeling error.

However, this
It is a

condition resulting from deficient data.
The reported results generally support the logical
expectation or widely accepted view that alliances are
beneficial.

However, the results are not as strong or

robust as the writer would prefer.

The hardship in

obtaining a long time series of data involving corporate
alliances between international airlines has been a key
contributing factor.

A greater number of observations is a

critical need to conduct a thorough study.
In summary, the regression model suggests that a
substantial proportion of the variations in KLM's traffic
revenue can be explained by the variations of KLM's number
of U.S. gates.

This result is statistically significant as

proven by the significance of the regression equation and
the T-Statistic value.

However, variations of other

independent variables have an inconclusive impact on the
variations of KLM's traffic revenue.

Therefore, the student

can conclude that KLM's traffic revenue will increase as
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they increase their access to U.S. gates.
The hypothesis that KLM's traffic revenue will increase
depending upon an alliance with Northwest Airlines has been
proven.

Thus, KLM has benefited from the alliance with

Northwest Airlines as their number of U.S. gates increased.

B. Recommendation for Future Study
There are three recommendations the student wishes to
make for future study.

First, this thesis can be studied

more thoroughly using an increased number of observations
and/or different dependant and/or independent variables.
The data will certainly be available as years go by.

With

an increased number of observations, the results of the
regression model will be more accurate and significant.

The

usage of other variables will provide information that has
not been covered by this thesis.

These findings can enhance

the overall study of the KLM/NW Airlines alliance case.
Second, another alliance case can be used to study the
benefits of an alliance.

The most recent alliance approved

by the U.S. Department of Transportation (in 1993) is an
alliance between British Airways and USAir.

As this thesis

documents, this particular alliance is carefully monitored
by numerous USAir competitors.

Therefore, studying the

development and the results of this alliance can be
extremely useful and interesting.
Finally, a qualitative study regarding the challenges
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of an alliance is recommended.

This thesis indicates that

disputes over cultural differences can spoil the prosperity
of an alliance.

Also, the concept of "our way of doing

things is best" can effect the viability of an alliance.
Hence, a thorough analysis of conflicts in cultural and
operational differences between alliance partners can be
beneficial regarding the study of an alliance.
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APPENDIX A: A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF KLM'S
TRAFFIC REVENUE RESIDUALS
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A Graphical Analysis of KLM's Traffic Revenue Residuals

Graph 1. KLM's Traffic Revenue Residuals

Residual
Values
°

(CO

?Cc

/cap

Y = KLM's Traffic Revenue (Mil. U.S. $)
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APPENDIX B: KLM'S ACTUAL vs. CALCULATED
TRAFFIC REVENUE AND RESIDUALS
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Table 9. Actual vs. Calculated KLM's Traffic Revenue and
Residuals
YEAR

ACTUAL TRAFFIC

CALCULATED

TRAFFIC

REVENUE (Mil.$)

TRAFFIC REVENUE

REVENUE

(Mil $)

RESIDUALS

JUNE 86

833

843

- 9.40

DEC. 86

834

867

-33 .25

JUNE 87

934

904

30.22

DEC. 87

935

942

- 7.90

JUNE 88

878

946

-68.04

DEC. 88

878

953

-74.91

JUNE 89

1003

904

99.02

DEC. 89

1003

936

66.72

JUNE 9 0

1226

1196

30.11

DEC. 90

1227

1222

4.64

JUNE 91

1084

1106

-22.20

DEC. 91

1084

1099

-15.07

Source : Values obtained through Stat+ software program

